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International Tax Law
SHARON STERN GERSTMAN, ELINORE RICHARDSON, SALVATORE MIRANDOLA,
STEPHANIE WONG, AND PAMELA A. FULLER*
This article reviews important international tax law developments during 2008 in the
United States, Canada, and Japan.
I. Developments in United States
There were two important developments in 2008 in U.S. tax law affecting foreign na-
tionals. On April 28, 2008, the U.S. Department of the Treasury released final regulations
under Section 1446 of the Internal Revenue Code' respecting withholdirig requirements
for foreign nationals within partnerships. 2 There were several modifications to the 2005
regulations, including changes in eligibility to certify losses and deductions to reduce
withholding, relief for partnership's failure to withhold, and the certification procedure.
Also of note is the decision by the Third Circuit in Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Commis-
sioner,3 which concerned the application of Treasury Regulation 1.882-4(a)(3)(i). That
regulation sets out filing deadlines for foreign nationals to claim real property deduc-
tions.4 Section 882 of the Internal Revenue Code5 did not specify any time requirement
for claiming the deductions but left to the Treasury and Internal Revenue Service the
manner of claiming the deductions. The United States Tax Court (the lower court) held
for the taxpayer and found that the regulation was unreasonable. The Third Circuit re-
versed, finding that the regulation was to be given deference under Chevron USA, Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.6 The Swallows case is considered significant not only
for the particular determination regarding the Regulation, but also for the level of defer-
ence generally to be given to Treasury Regulations.
* Sharon Stern Gerstman, Buffalo, New York, served as editor and drafted the portions of the article
dealing with the United States; Elinore Richardson, Stephanie Wong, and Salvatore Mirandola, Partners at
Borden Ladner Gervais LLP, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, drafted the Canada portion; and Pamela A. Fuller,
J.D., LL.M. (Tax Law) of New York, New York, drafted the Japan portion.
1. I.R.C. § 1446 (West 2008).
2. Treas. Reg. § 1.1446 (as amended by T.D. 9394, 2008-21 I.R.B. 988).
3. Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008).
4. Treas. Reg. § 1.882-4(a)(3)(i) (1960).
5. I.R.C. § 882 (West 2008).
6. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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II. Developments in Canada
A. GLAxoSmrrHKLiNE INC. v. THE QUEEN
In a lengthy judgment released on May 30, 2008, the Tax Court of Canada in GlaxoS-
mithKline Inc. v. The Queen7 considered whether the price paid by the Canadian taxpayer
to a related Swiss company for ranitidine hydrochloride (the active pharmaceutical ingre-
dient in ulcer medication sold in Canada by the taxpayer under the brand name Zantac)
was "reasonable in the circumstances" under subsection 69(2) of the Income Tax Act (Ca-
nada),8 a predecessor provision to the current transfer pricing rules in Section 247 of the
Act.
In conducting its transfer pricing analysis, the Court endorsed the ordering of methods
set out in the OECD's Report on Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises (the
Transfer Pricing Guidelines), concluding that the comparable uncontrolled price (CUP)
method was the preferred method for determining a reasonable price for the taxpayer's
purchase of ranitidine unless there was no comparable transaction to that of the taxpayer.
Under the CUP method, the appropriate transfer price is determined by reference to
comparable transactions between an arm's length buyer and seller, which are representa-
tive of the market.
During the taxation years in question, two corporations in the Glaxo group carried out
the primary manufacturing of ranitidine, one based in Singapore and the other in the
United Kingdom. Ranitidine manufactured by these two companies was sold at a uniform
price to one of two clearing companies in the Glaxo group, one based in Switzerland and
the other in Asia. In turn, the clearing companies sold ranitidine for varying prices to
companies in different countries. In the relevant years, the Glaxo group's transfer pricing
arrangements allowed the Singapore manufacturer to earn gross profits of about ninety
percent, which were not taxed in Singapore, on the sale of ranitidine to the Swiss clearing
company, while the taxpayer was earning gross profits of about fifty-seven percent. 9 In
many European markets, the Glaxo group entered into agreements with third party dis-
tributors who performed primarily marketing, detailing, and distribution functions. In
determining the transfer price of ranitidine to such distributors, the Glaxo group used the
resale price method to determine the appropriate price based on the distributors retaining
a gross margin of sixty percent on their sales.10
As a preliminary matter in its analysis, the Court concluded that the pricing of rani-
tidine under the Supply Agreement between the taxpayer and the related Swiss company
should be considered without regard to the Licensing Agreement under which the tax-
payer paid a six percent royalty to another related company for the use of intangibles and
services related to the sale of Zantac and other medications.11 In the Court's view, the two
agreements covered separate matters and could not be combined so as to ignore the dis-
tinct tax treatment flowing from each transaction. The Court also determined that it
could rely on the 1995 version of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines even though it was
7. GlaxoSmithKline Inc. v. Her Majesty the Queen, [2008] D.T.C. 3957 (TCC) (under appeal to FCA.).
8. Income Tax Act (Canada), R.S.C., ch. 1 (1985) (5th supp.), as amended [hereinafter the Act].
9. GlaxoSmithKline Inc., [2008] D.T.C. 3957, at T 13.
10. Id. 47.
11. Id. 1 14.
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released after the taxation years in question, as neither party to the appeal pointed to any
inconsistencies between the 1995 and 1979 versions, and both parties had cited the 1995
version in their written submissions. 12
Based upon a consideration of the expert evidence and the Transfer Pricing Guidelines,
the Court concluded that third party manufacturers' sales of a generic version of the medi-
cation in Canada during the years in question were an appropriate comparable using the
CUP method. 13 In doing so, the Court rejected the taxpayer's argument that its business
circumstances were wholly different from those of the generic companies so as to render
the generic companies' transactions not comparable to its transactions. There was no
evidence that the price or value of ranitidine had any effect on the price of the medication
produced, especially since the Glaxo group determined the pricing of ranitidine based on
the ultimate price of the medication under the resale price method. Accordingly, the
Court viewed "any difference in business strategy between the [taxpayer] and the generic
companies [as relating] to the end selling price" of the medication rather than the
purchase price of ranitidine and, thus, concluded that the taxpayer's business circum-
stances and strategies had no bearing on the transfer pricing issue. 14
The Court also rejected the taxpayer's argument that the ranitidine manufactured
within the Glaxo group and purchased by it was not comparable to the ranitidine pur-
chased by the generic companies because of differences in the Glaxo group's good manu-
facturing practices (GMPs) and health, safety, and environmental standards.' 5 Expert
evidence indicated that the ranitidine purchased by the generic companies was chemically
equivalent and bioequivalent to the Glaxo group's ranitidine and was approved for sale by
the Health Protection Branch of Health Canada. Although the Court conceded that the
Glaxo group's GMPs had some value in that they may have provided some comfort that
its ranitidine had "minimal impurities and [was] manufactured in a responsible manner,"
they did not affect the comparability of the Glaxo group's ranitidine with the ranitidine
purchased by the generic companies. 16
The generic companies were an appropriate comparable for the following reasons: they
operated and competed in the same economic market; there was no difference in sub-
stance between the ranitidine purchased by the generic companies and the taxpayer; they
both purchased ranitidine at the wholesale level; they generally performed similar func-
tions, i.e., "secondary manufacture, sales and distribution, and research and development";
and they performed very similar functions with respect to the ranitidine, i.e., purchasing
bulk ranitidine from primary manufacturers, conducting secondary manufacturing in Ca-
nada, and carrying out marketing and distribution of the finished product.' 7
In contrast, the Glaxo group's European third party distributors were not an appropri-
ate comparable using the CUP method (or the resale price method used by the taxpayer to
support its purchase price of ranitidine) because the European markets and transactions
differed significantly from the Canadian market and transactions, and it was not possible
to compensate for the differences. For example, the Glaxo group had a monopoly in
12. Id. 1 83.
13. Id. 161.
14. Id. 190.
15. Id. 1 118.
16. Id.
17. Id. It 120-30.
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certain European countries that gave it the opportunity to charge high prices for third
party sales of ranitidine. Moreover, generic drugs were available in the Canadian market
at that time, but were not available in most European markets.18 Also, the transactions
between the Glaxo group and its European licenses generally included the purchase of
ranitidine bundled with the use of intangibles for a single price, whereas the taxpayer had
a separate supply agreement under which it paid a price for the purchase of ranitidine
only.19 The taxpayer also performed more functions and assumed more obligations than
the European distributors, justifying a lower transfer price or a higher gross profit margin
to the taxpayer under the resale price method.
In its analysis, the Court also found that the taxpayer had not satisfactorily established
the transfer price paid by the Glaxo group's European distributors and provided no expla-
nation for excluding certain potentially comparable distributors that had lower transfer
prices. The taxpayer's position was not helped by the results of its transfer pricing analysis
using the resale price method, as there was a wide range among the gross profit margins
estimated for the included European distributors (from 45.8% to 82.4%) which, in the
opposing expert's opinion, undermined the reliability of the analysis. 20
Since the Court found that the generic companies were an appropriate comparable
under the CUP method, the taxpayer's use of the European distributors as a comparable
under the resale price method was rejected, as was its use of the transactional net margin
method (TNMM) as a reasonableness check on the price paid by it for ranitidine.
Taxpayers who deal with transfer pricing issues in their businesses should take heed of
the fact that in analyzing its first major transfer pricing case, the Court fully endorsed the
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, including its recommended ordering of transfer pricing
methods, its endorsement of traditional transaction methods over the profit-split method
and the TNMM, and its preference for the CUP method over all other methods.
B. OTHER CANADIAN TAx COURT DECISIONS
The Tax Court of Canada released two judgments on May 16, 2008: American Income
Life Insurance Company v. Her Majesty the Queen2l and Knights of Columbus v. Her Majesty
the Queen.22 These decisions provide valuable judicial insight with respect to the meaning
of "permanent establishment" in the Treaty and with respect to the more general interpre-
tation and application of this concept as it is used in OECD-type tax treaties.
The facts in each case are strikingly similar. The taxpayer, in each case, was a U.S.-
based life insurer that solicited sales of life insurance policies to Canadians. In each case,
the solicitations were made by Canadian-resident agents who were remunerated on a
commission basis. Each sales agent was an independent contractor and was part of a geo-
graphically-based hierarchy of agents. Generally, the further up the hierarchy an agent
was, the less his or her duties involved sales solicitation and the more his or her duties
involved supervision and sales management. Typically, sales solicitation occurred at the
prospective insured's home. The sales agent would explain the various insurance products
18. Id. 55.
19. Id. T 138.
20. Id. T 148.
21. Am. Income Life Ins. Co. v. Her Majesty the Queen, [2009] 2 C.T.C. 2114 (TCC.).
22. Knights of Columbus v. Her Majesty the Queen, [2009] 1 C.T.C. 2163 (TCC.).
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available and assist the prospective insured in completing a life insurance application. The
application was forwarded to the taxpayer's underwriting department. All underwriting
activities, and all decisions with respect to accepting (with or without modification the
insurance applied for based on the information in the application) or denying coverage
were made by the taxpayer's employees in the United States. Each taxpayer was managed
in the United States. Neither taxpayer had its own offices in Canada.23
In most cases, a prospective insured who provided the initial insurance premium to the
sales agent was provided with limited temporary life insurance that took effect as of the
time of the application, provided that the insured's coverage was approved (in the United
States) as applied for, without modification. In other words, once the insured's applica-
tion was approved "as is," the temporary insurance took effect on a retroactive basis from
the time of the application.
Both taxpayers were regulated by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institu-
tions (OSFI). Canada's insurance laws required each taxpayer to have a so-called "Chief
Agent" in Canada, whose responsibilities included records management, serving as an at-
torney-for-service, and assisting OSFI in ensuring that various reserve-related and finan-
cial Canadian regulatory requirements were met.2 4 Each taxpayer made extensive
Canadian regulatory/financial filings with OSFI.
Each taxpayer took the position that it was not subject to tax in Canada on its business
profits associated with the sale of insurance policies to Canadian insured's because they
did not have a permanent establishment in Canada within the meaning of the Treaty.
Canada's federal tax authority (the Canada Revenue Agency, or CRA) disagreed and as-
sessed Canadian tax on the business profits it determined to be attributed to the Canadian
business activities. CRA took the position that each non-resident insurer had a fixed base
permanent establishment (either or all of the homes or offices of agents and Chief Agent)
or a dependent agent permanent establishment (on the grounds that sales agents were not
of independent status and concluded temporary or permanent insurance or other con-
tracts on behalf of the insurer or that the Chief Agent concluded such contracts). 25
Accordingly, the issues in each case were as follows:
* Did the taxpayer have fixed place permanent establishments within the meaning of
Article V(1) of the Treaty?
* Did the taxpayer have dependent agent permanent establishments in Canada? In
other words, did the taxpayer's dependent agents conclude contracts on behalf of
the taxpayer, within the meaning of Article V(5) of the Treaty? And, if they did,
were the agents "of independent status" within the meaning of Article V(7) of the
Treaty? 26
In each case, the Tax Court of Canada concluded that the taxpayer had no permanent
establishment in Canada. Neither case was appealed by the Crown.
Throughout the judgments, the Tax Court referred to extrinsic evidence in order to
give legal content to the concept of permanent establishment. That extrinsic evidence
included review of the OECD Commentaries, because the Treaty is modeled on the
23. Am. Income Life Ins. Co., [2009] 2 C.T.C. 2114, 9 3-24; Knights of Columbus, [200911 C.T.C. 2163, 1J
3-23.
24. Knights of Colombus, [2009] 1 C.T.C. 2163, 7.
25. Id. 47; Am. Income Life Ins. Co., 120091 2 C.T.C. 2114, 1 34.
26. Am. Income Life Ins. Co., [2009] 2 C.T.C. 2114, 32; Knights of Colombus, [20091 1 C.T.C. 2163, T 1.
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OECD's Model Convention, and the testimony of various experts in the Knights of Colum-
bus matter. Extrinsic evidence has been determined to be particularly helpful in interpret-
ing international tax treaties by the Canadian courts because, as previously pointed out by
the Supreme Court of Canada, "[i]n interpreting a treaty, the paramount goal is to find
the meaning of the words in question. This process involves looking to the language used
and the intentions of the parties." 27 The testimony of the expert witnesses, in particular,
was also found to be 'relevant and necessary to assist the Tax Court in determining the
intentions of the drafters of the Treaty. Overall, the extrinsic evidence assisted the Tax
Court in making several significant legal findings relating to the interpretation of the
concept of permanent establishment, including the following:
* A fixed base permanent establishment will not exist unless all of the following are
true:
(i) there must exist a place of business;
(ii) there must be a degree of permanence to that place of business; and
(iii) the business of the non-resident (not the business of any agents in Canada)
must be carried on through that place of business.28
* A dependent agent permanent establishment will not exist unless the following are
true:
(i) there is a person who habitually exercises authority to conclude contracts in the
name of the non-resident; and
(ii) that person is not an agent of independent status acting in the ordinary course
of his or her business. 29
* The types of contract that are relevant for determining whether an agent concludes
contracts in the name of the non-resident are contracts that constitute the "business
proper" of the non-resident. 30
* In determining whether an agent is of independent status, a court must examine
both legal independence and economic independence. Only an agent that is both
legally and economically independent will be found to be an agent of independent
status, and therefore not capable of constituting a dependent agent permanent
establishment.31
There were two other matters in which the expert testimony was particularly helpful to
the Tax Court. First, the Tax Court concluded that a fixed base permanent establishment
will not exist if the non-resident does not have a "right of disposition" or "power of dispo-
sal" (the two phrases appear to have been used interchangeably) in reference to the Cana-
dian premises in question. 32 The Tax Court (and the experts) appear to have had some
difficulty in defining precisely what was meant by a right of disposition or a power of
disposal. Ultimately, the Tax Court concluded that, "it comes down to...distinguishing
the agents' business activities from the [non-resident's] business activities," and the in-
27. Crown Forest Indus. Ltd. v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 802.
28. Am. Income Life Ins. Co., [2009] 2 C.T.C. 2114, 9 34.
29. Knights of Colombus, [2009] 1 C.T.C. 2163, T 49. The Court also pointed out that an agent cannot be
engaged in certain preparatory or auxiliary activities, defined in Article V(6) of the Treaty.
30. Id. 49.
31. Am. Income Life Ins. Co., [2009] 2 C.T.C. 2114, 74.
32. Knights of Colombus, [2009] 1 C.T.C. 2163, 9j 33, 78.
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quiry is to determine if a sufficient amount of the non-resident's business activities are
being carried on from the Canadian premises in question. 33
The second matter in respect of which the Tax Court relied on the experts' testimony
related to the inference to be drawn from the absence of a so-called insurance clause in the
Treaty. Many UN-type model treaties (and some treaties to which Canada is a party)
contain clauses that deem a permanent establishment to exist in an insurance company
context if the non-resident insures risks in the source jurisdiction or if premiums are col-
lected from insured's in the source jurisdiction. The Treaty does not contain such a
clause, and both taxpayers argued, relying on OECD Commentary, expert witness testi-
mony, and U.S. jurisprudence, that the absence of such a clause in the Treaty permitted
the Court to infer that the Treaty contemplates that a U.S. insurance company may con-
duct large-scale business in Canada without having a permanent establishment in Canada.
The Tax Court agreed, noting that Canada "has had many opportunities over several years
to add the insurance clause to the Canada-U.S. Treaty, but it has chosen not to do so,"
even though an insurance clause is included in some of Canada's other tax treaties.34
With this background, the Tax Court held that neither U.S. insurer had a permanent
establishment in Canada. None of the agents' premises (homes or offices) constituted
fixed base permanent establishments because it was the agents' businesses that were con-
ducted from those premises, not the insurers' businesses. Neither insurer had a sufficient
power of disposal over the agents' premises. Numerous factors (listed especially in the
American Income Life case) pointed towards the conclusion that the agents' premises were
used to conduct the agents' businesses of "soliciting sales" or "developing a hierarchy of
agents.""3 Similarly, each Chief Agent's office was not a fixed base permanent establish-
ment of the non-resident insurer-the Chief Agent conducted his own law or accounting
business and fulfilled regulatory functions for the non-resident insurer in connection with
that business.
Similarly, the Court found that neither insurer had dependent agent permanent estab-
lishments in Canada because the agents did not conclude contracts (that were part of the
non-resident insurer's "business proper") on behalf of the non-resident insurer. 36 The
Court concluded, relying on arguments made in the American Income Life case, that be-
cause the temporary insurance agreements were part of the underlying insurance policy of
each insurer, and because the underlying insurance policy was concluded in the United
States following the insurers' underwriting analysis, Canadian agents did not conclude
contracts on behalf of the non-resident insurer by virtue of the agents' involvement in the
temporary insurance agreements. In any event, on the facts, most or all of the agents were
of independent status because they were legally and economically independent (again, nu-
merous specific factors were listed in the American Income Life case). It did not matter that
certain contracts (for example, agent agreements and the Chief Agents' signing authority
over Canadian bank accounts) may have been concluded in Canada because those con-
tracts were not part of the "business proper" of the non-resident insurer.
33. Id. 1 79.
34. Id. 1 84.
35. Am. Income Life Ins. Co., [2009] 2 C.T.C. 2114, T 53.
36. Id. T 58; Knights of Colmbus, [2009] 1 C.T.C. 2163, % 50.
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American Income Life and Knights of Columbus should be considered as welcome additions
by international tax professionals in cross border planning where the meaning of perma-
nent establishment and the scope of a source jurisdiction's capacity to tax the business
profits of non-resident business enterprises under OECD-type treaties that contain simi-
lar "Permanent Establishment" and "Business Profits" provisions is involved. Taken to-
gether, the cases work to provide a comprehensive analysis of the legal and practical
content of the permanent establishment concept. Knights of Columbus provides guidance
as to the role of experts in tax treaty cases generally and as to the requirement that a non-
resident enterprise must have a "power of disposal" over the premises in which the busi-
ness activities are carried on for the premises to be considered a fixed base permanent
establishment. American Income Life provides a practical checklist of specific factors that a
court and taxpayers should consider in determining (i) whose business is being carried on
at the premises in question for purposes of determining if there is a fixed base permanent
establishment and (ii) whether an agent is sufficiently legally and economically indepen-
dent to be considered an agent of independent status. Finally, in the insurance company
context specifically, the cases may support the contention that, in circumstances where a
tax treaty does not contain an insurance clause, a court may construe such an absence as
implicit agreement by the treaty parties that an insurer resident in one contracting treaty
state may conduct large-scale business in the other treaty state without attracting that
state's income tax on business profits.
IH. Developments in Japan
In January 2008, months before the full extent of its financial woes came to light,37 the
U.S. financial giant Citigroup, Inc. acquired the Japanese brokerage firm Nikko Cordial
Corporation for approximately 530 billion yen (US$4.8 billion). The transaction marks
the first time a foreign company has employed Japan's newly authorized cross-border tri-
angular merger technique in an acquisition-a tax-deferred corporate reorganization long
accepted and authorized by many other industrialized nations' laws, but neither legal nor
tax-free under Japanese law until May 2007, following a long and public debate. Ci-
tigroup, a U.S. publicly traded corporation, which already had a presence in Japan
37. On Nov. 23, 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department agreed to bail-out financially distressed Citigroup,
Inc., which had sustained hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars in losses since the worldwide credit crisis began
in 2007 with the collapse of the U.S. subprime mortgage market. Under the 2008 rescue plan, the U.S.
government will recapitalize Citigroup with US$20 billion and shoulder most of the losses the financial giant
has accrued on its $306 billion portfolio. In exchange, the U.S. government will receive preferred Citigroup
shares and warrants to buy Citigroup common stock See David Ellis, Citi Dodges Bullet, CNNMNE.COM,
Nov. 24, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/l1/23/news/companies/citigroup/?postversion=2008112400.
Citigroup had to make other concessions, such as cut-backs on executive compensation. Citigroup also an-
nounced plans in late 2008 to cut personnel at its Japanese subsidiaries. Specifically, employees at Citigroup's
Japanese retail and wholesale brokerages will be asked to accept early retirement packages with incentive
bonuses equal to nearly two times an employee's annual salary. With Japan's business environment deterio-
rating, Citigroup may be compelled to further restructure its operations in Japan and carry out additional
reductions in its work force. The labor reductions are bound to trigger claims of "I told you so" by certain
Japanese groups and opponents of the cross-border merger provision who had argued for more insular rules
and wamed of domestic labor troubles if the triangular merger technique became legal.
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through its 100 percent owned subsidiary, Citigroup Japan Holdings Ltd.,3s was seeking
to expand and develop comprehensive financial services in Japan and East Asia by combin-
ing both brokerage and banking services at the retail level. This goal is especially wel-
come from Japan's perspective, as evinced by several massive Japanese legislative packages
in recent years, all aimed at getting more Japanese individuals to shift their enormous
collective savings out of low-interest deposits into higher-yielding investments. 39 With
Citigroup's own losses from the collapse of the subprime mortgage market beginning to
mount in 2007, Citigroup apparently chose this tax-deferred acquisition structure since it
could use its own stock as acquisition currency, avoiding the necessity of a large cash
expenditure.40
Although the battered U.S. financial services giant later announced, in April 2009, that
the global financial meltdown was causing it to auction off large portions of its Japanese
operations once seen as central to its growth-including the market trading divisions of
Nikko Citigroup Ltd., along with the retail brokerage, Nikko Cordial Securities, Inc.4 1-
Citigroup's original acquisition method will endure as a legal legacy, marking a funda-
mental turning point in Japan's international tax policy. 42
38. In the Spring of 2007, Citigroup Holdings launched a tender offer for Nikko shares in which it ac-
quired 68 percent of Nikko's outstanding stock. Because most of Nikko's shares were already owned by the
Japanese subsidiary of Citigroup, that subsidiary, as a Nikko shareholder, could be relied upon to approve the
triangular merger. See Citi Swallows Nikko via Tri-Merger, NiKKEI WEEKLY, Oct. 8, 2007.
39. Between late June 2005 and 2006, when Japan passed several mammoth pieces of legislation aimed at
expanding Japan's financial services and investments market, including the 2006 Financial Instruments and
Exchange Law, and the Privatization Acts, nearly 51 percent of Japanese households' financial portfolios were
held in cash and deposits, as opposed to just 18.5 percent in stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and investment
trusts. By contrast, U.S. households' portfolios averaged 13.5 percent in cash and deposits and 53 percent in
stocks, bonds, mutual funds, etc., while German households averaged thirty-five percent in cash and deposits
and 33.4 percent in stock, bonds, mutual funds, etc. See FiNANCiAL SERVICES AGENCY, JAPAN, NEW LiEGiS-
LATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTOR PROTECTION-FINANCIAL INSTRUMFNTS AND EXCiIANGE LAW 3
(2006), available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/policy/fiel/200610l0.pdf. For an overview and circumspect analy-
sis of Japan's sweeping Privatization Act, a major piece of legislation ostensibly aimed at opening up Japan
Post-perhaps the world's largest state subsidized savings deposit institutions-to private and foreign compe-
tition over a ten-year period, see Pamela A. Fuller, Asia and Pacific Law, 41 INT'L LAv. 711, 717-26 (2007).
For an overview of the 2006 Financial Instruments and Exchange Law, see Pamela A. Fuller, International
Investment and Development, 42 ,rr'L LAW. 511, 518-23 (2008).
40. Unlike a direct merger, where the target is merged directly into the corporate acquirer, the structure
employed by Citigroup is called a "triangular merger" by M&A and corporate tax attorneys because a subsidi-
ary is used as an acquisition vehicle. Under terms of the triangular merger, Citigroup first transferred some
of its own shares to its wholly owned Japanese subsidiary (Citigroup Holdings), which shares were then
immediately transferred to Nikko in consideration for the exchange of all of Nikko's assets and liabilities.
Nikko, in turn, transferred Citigroup's stock to its own shareholders who, in exchange, relinquished their
shares in Nikko (the target). Nikko was then legally merged into Citigroup Holdings in May 2008. Follow-
ing the transaction, Citigroup Holdings held all of Nikko's business assets and liabilities in corporate solution
and continued to conduct the businesses formerly conducted by Nikko, including Nikko's former subsidiar-
ies and unincorporated divisions. Citigroup Holdings continued as the wholly owned Japanese subsidiary of
Citigroup. Many of Nikko's former shareholders became shareholders of the U.S. parent Citigroup, al-
though any shareholders who objected to the deal had the option to receive cash instead of Citigroup shares.
41. See Citigroup Considers Sale of Some Nikko Citigroup Ops, NIKKEi, April 14, 2009.
42. Reversing its previous stance that its Japanese brokerage operations would not be put on the auction
block, Citigroup Inc. announced in mid-April 2009 that it was leaning towards selling large parts of Nikko
Citigroup Ltd., along with the retail brokerage Nikko Cordial Securities, as part of its restructuring efforts.
On April 20, 2009, Japan's three largest banks-Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Inc., Mitsubishi UFJ
Financial Group Inc. (MUFG), and Mizuho Financial Group Inc-each submitted offers to buy Nikko Cor-
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Over the past decade, Japan has been authorizing more and more tax-deferred corpo-
rate restructuring techniques, but none were permitted in the cross-border context.
Rather, mergers and acquisitions between Japanese and foreign companies has been
stymied by Japan's lack of transactional tools to achieve optimal structures for multina-
tional corporations. For years, Japan's Commercial Code (the predecessor to the 2005
Companies Law) allowed direct mergers between two Japanese corporations, but direct
mergers involving foreign corporations were not allowed. Likewise, the Commercial
Code did not allow merging companies to use shares of a foreign corporation as consider-
ation in the merger.43
Finally, on May 1, 2007, a controversial provision contained in the 2005 Companies
Law44 allowing Japanese companies to engage in cross-border triangular mergers with
foreign corporations took effect after a long debate over the new rule's potential impact
on foreign investment in Japan. Like the former Commercial Code, the 2005 Companies
Law still does not permit a direct merger between a Japanese corporation and a foreign
corporation, but it does sanction inbound triangular mergers-meaning that shares of the
acquiring Japanese corporation's foreign parent can be used as consideration in the deal.
Thus, under the provision, the parent of the surviving corporation can be a foreign entity,
but both the merged target and the surviving corporation (i.e., the Japanese subsidiary
into which the target is merged)45 must be resident Japanese corporations, which means
that the new law only facilitates inbound investment transactions.46
The Japanese government hopes that lifting the ban on cross-border triangular mergers
will stimulate a higher level of foreign direct investment (FDI) into Japan, which level lags
way below the inward FDI levels of other industrialized countries.47 Because foreign cor-
dial Securities Inc. in a deal that is expected to total 400 to 500 billion yen. After it reviews the bids, Ci-
tigroup will grant preferential negotiating rights to one of the bidders, setting the stage for the final
agreement. Because MUFG is Japan's largest banking group, it is seen as the leading candidate. See SMFG,
MUFG, Mizuho in Round 2 Nikko Cordial Bid, NisIEi, April 21, 2009; MUFG Seen as Front-Runner In Deal
For Nikko Cordial, Nss, us April 21, 2009.
43. This policy was not on par with the laws of other industrialized countries, most of which sanction
several tax-deferred methods of structuring cross-border corporate reorganizations involving foreign corpo-
rations. See, e.g., U.S. Treas. Regs. §§ 1.367(a)-3(c) and 1.367(a)-3(d)(3), Example 5 (1998) (U.S). In a sense,
Japan shares the same fears as far less developed countries, which are more reluctant to legalize tax-deferred
share exchanges between domestic and foreign corporations due to fears of expropriation.
44. Kaisha Ho [Companies Law], Law No. 86 of 2005 [hereinafter 2005 Companies Law]. The 2005 Com-
panies Law integrated several statutes covering Japan's business entities, including rules applicable to their
incorporation, governance, and power to flexibly engage in M&A transactions. For an overview, see Pamela
A. Fuller Asia and Pacific Law: Japan, 40 INTr'L LAW. 515, 521-23 (2006); Pamela A. Fuller, International
Mergers and Acquisitions: Japan, 40 INTr'L LAW. 311, 325-28 (2006).
45. American tax attorneys often refer to this structure, in which the target's corporate identity is dissolved,
as a "forward triangular merger." A "reverse triangular merger," in which the target corporation survives,
and the parent corporation's subsidiary dissolves, is a very popular U.S. acquisition technique, but it is not
presently sanctioned under Japan's Companies Law, as amended.
46. A corporation is considered a resident of Japan if either its headquarters or principal office is located in
Japan. For a more extensive explanation of these rules, including the potential for creating so-called dual
resident companies, and their tax treaunent, see Pamela A. Fuller, The Japan-U.S. Income Tax Treaty: Signal-
ing New Norms, Inspiring Reforms, or Just Tweaking Anachronisms in International Tax Policy?, 40 INT'L LAw.
773, 791-93, 807-18 (2006).
47. In 2006, Japan's inward foreign direct investment (FDI) set a new record, increasing by 51.7 percent to
US$45.6 billion. Both Japan's inward and outward FDI levels hit record peaks but resulted in a net capital
investment outflow of US$6.8 billion, taking into account the balance of payments. In contrast, almost all
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porations will be able to use their own stock as takeover currency, the new amendment
makes it less expensive and easier for foreign corporations to acquire Japanese companies.
But the possibility that these acquisitive reorganizations might be too easy to execute
has triggered fears that they might result in a wave of unfriendly foreign takeovers of
Japanese companies. Although mergers must necessarily be negotiated by corporate
boards and are not tantamount to hostile takeover bids,48 Japan's powerful business lobby,
the Japan Business Federation, also known as Nippon Keidanren (Keidanren), warned the
provision could give potential acquirers the chance to sell a Japanese target's assets and
fire its employees immediately after a merger. Apparently likening the potential effects of
cross-border mergers to hostile acquisitions, the Keidanren convinced lawmakers to defer
the effective date of the foreign merger provision by one year, to May 2007, in order to
draft special provisions to restrict the acquisition technique's availability. Most foreign
business interests and academics heavily criticized the proposed restrictions as too protec-
tive and also violative of Japan's international obligation to refrain from discriminating
against foreign investors. 49 Ultimately, the Diet rejected the restrictions and on May 1,
2007, lifted the ban on cross-border triangular mergers without further extensions of the
provision's effective date.
Cross-border triangular mergers, even if legalized, stood little chance of becoming pop-
ular acquisition vehicles in Japan if the target company's shareholders, who exchange their
shares in the target corporation for shares in the foreign acquirer's parent corporation,
were required to immediately recognize and pay tax on the shares they relinquished with-
out the receipt of cash to pay that tax.50 Prior to amendment, shareholders of a Japanese
target could only defer tax on their exchanged shares if the acquiring company was an-
other Japanese corporation.
other industrialized countries recorded a net capital inflow of FDI in 2006. For example, the United States
netted an FDI inflow of US$180.5 billion; the United Kingdom netted an FDI inflow of US$139.5 billion;
France netted an FDI inflow of US$81 billion; and China netted an FDI inflow of US$78 billion. See JAPAN
EXTERNAL TRADE ORGANIZATION, 2007 JETRO WHITE PAPER ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FOR-
EIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT-INCREASING UTILIZATION OF ASIAN FTAs AND GROWTH STRATEGIES FOR
JAPANESE COMPANIES 50 (Aug. 8, 2007), available at www.jetro.go.jp/en/stats/white-paper/. Because Japan's
population is aging rapidly, Japan needs more inward foreign investment to sustain its gross domestic prod-
uct. Former Prime Minister Koizumi had set a goal, in 2002, of doubling inward FDI by the year 2007. But
it soon became clear that his goal was unrealistic, especially after the government decided to delay, by one
year, the effective date of the 2005 Companies Law provision sanctioning cross-border forward triangular
mergers. In late 2006, the government set a new goal of doubling inward FDI by the year 2010.
48. A triangular merger is an "extraordinary transaction" under Japanese law, which generally requires a
two-thirds majority vote of both the target company's shareholders and the acquiring Japanese company's
shareholders. While it is theoretically possible to get this level of approval without management's consent, it
is highly unlikely, even in a U.S. corporation, much less in a Japanese one.
49. Arguably, Japan's international obligations as a member of the World Trade Organization require au-
thorization of cross-border triangular mergers due to the "national treatment" principle-i.e., the obligation
requiring contracting countries to accord to a person, item, or activity originating in another contracting
country treatment that is no less favorable than the treatment accorded to a domestic person, item, or activity.
See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
50. Technically, in a forward triangular merger, the target company's shareholders exchange their old
shares in the target for new shares in the foreign parent corporation and take an exchanged tax basis in the
shares received. In general, a target shareholder who receives only stock (i.e., or other "permissible consider-
ation") in a so-called "tax-free corporate reorganization" may defer tax recognition until the shareholder
subsequently sells or disposes of the shares received in a taxable transaction.
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In late 2006, Japan's tax authorities decided that foreign triangular mergers should re-
ceive virtually the same favorable tax treatment as purely domestic mergers and amended
the tax law accordingly. This means that the inherent built-in gains and losses in the
target's assets, and the built-in gains and losses inherent in the target shareholders' stock,
may be tax deferred so long as the triangular merger satisfies certain requirements, which
are generally more stringent and protective than most industrialized countries' rules in
that no transient subsidiaries may be used as acquisition vehicles.
In particular, tax deferral in cross-border triangular mergers is allowed only if the fol-
lowing four requirements are met:
1. the foreign parent must hold 100% of the Japanese acquiring corporation prior
to the merger and not intend to quickly dispose of the shares once the merger is
completed;
2. a substantial percentage of the consideration given to the target's shareholders
must be stock in the foreign parent;
3. the Japanese acquiring corporation must not be a transient corporation and must
be engaged in a Japanese trade or business prior to the merger; and
4. the Japanese target and the Japanese acquiring corporation must meet a separate
business relationship test, intended to ensure that the acquiring corporation is a bona
fide business and that the transaction has a legitimate business purpose.51
Japan's legalization of cross-border triangular mergers is an important step towards open-
ing up the country's capital markets to foreign direct investment. Indeed, this newly au-
thorized tax efficient structure has already helped attract one of the world's financial
giants, Citigroup, to invest in Japan. Despite the credit crisis that rocked major banks and
economies in 2008, this restructuring method is nonetheless bound to help Japan reach its
short-term goal of doubling inward FDI by the year 2010 and its long-range goal of be-
coming more competitive in the international marketplace for capital. While this type of
merger is not likely to be used in hostile acquisitions, it may be an excellent vehicle for a
white knight-the potential acquirer chosen by a target's board to rescue it from an un-
wanted bidder's takeover attempt. This defensive use of foreign triangular mergers would
be most welcome in Japan's current, rather insular, corporate environment, and highly
ironic given that the transaction's Japanese detractors were so fearful these transactions
would become a powerful offensive tool in the hands of hostile foreign acquirers.
52
51. See Shorei [Ministry Ordinance], Int'l Tax Policy Div., Tax Bureau, Ministry of Finance, April 13, 2007
(setting forth conditions for tax deferral in cross-border triangular mergers).
52. In 2008, there is new evidence that Japanese companies are reviving their traditional defense against
hostile takeovers by placing large blocks of stock in the hands of loyal, affiliated companies, which, as history
as shown, can be relied upon to support incumbent corporate boards. Moreover, many Japanese companies
are rushing to institute other anti-takeover devises, such as poison pills-stock acquisition rights that can
typically be used to dilute the voting power of an unwanted suitor. For an analytical overview of these
developments, as well as a summary of newly revised ministry sponsored Takeover Guidelines, see another
article in this volume, Pamela A. Fuller, InternationalM &A andJoint Ventures, 43 INT'L LAW. 367, 402-405
(2009).
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